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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
DENNIS GREGORY SMITH,
Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 48435-2020
Kootenai County Case No.
CR28-20-5555

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

Has Dennis Gregory Smith failed to show that the district court abused its sentencing
discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of twenty years, with six years determinate, upon
his conviction for trafficking in heroin?
ARGUMENT
Smith Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
A.

Introduction
An officer stopped Smith for speeding and arrested him for DUI. (PSI, pp.3-4, 18-19.) A

search of Smith’s car uncovered heroin, methamphetamine, various pills, and numerous items of
drug paraphernalia. (Id.)
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The state charged Smith with trafficking in heroin, possession of methamphetamine, DUI,
possession of buspirone hydrochloride without a prescription, possession of cyclobenzaprine
hydrochloride without a prescription, and possession of paraphernalia. (R., pp.94-96.) The state
also alleged that Smith was a persistent violator of the law. (R., p.96.) Pursuant to a plea
agreement, Smith pled guilty to trafficking in heroin and DUI. (6/29/20 Tr., p.17, Ls.10-25; see
R., pp.108-09; Aug., pp.1-3.) In exchange for Smith’s guilty pleas, the state dismissed the
remaining charges and the persistent violator enhancement. (R., p.114.)
For trafficking in heroin, the district court imposed a unified sentence of twenty years, with
six years determinate. (10/21/20 Tr., p.32, Ls.9-22; R., pp.141-42.) The court imposed 180 days
of jail with 180 days credit for time served for driving under the influence. (10/21/20 Tr., p.32,
Ls.2-8; R., p.143.) Smith timely appealed. (R., pp.144-46.)
On appeal, Smith asserts the district court abused its sentencing discretion by imposing an
excessive sentence for trafficking in heroin. (Appellant’s brief, pp.3-5. 1) Specifically, he argues
the district court did not exercise reason because it failed to properly consider mitigating factors.
(Id.) Smith’s argument is unavailing. Application of the relevant legal standards shows that the
district court did not abuse its sentencing discretion.
B.

Standard Of Review
“When evaluating whether a sentence is excessive, [the] Court considers the entire length

of the sentence under an abuse of discretion standard.” State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8, 368
P.3d 621, 628 (2016) (citation omitted). When a trial court's discretionary decision is reviewed on
appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine whether the lower court:
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Smith does not challenge his misdemeanor sentence on appeal. (Appellant’s brief, p.3 n.3.)
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(1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the boundaries of its
discretion; (3) acted consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices
available to it; and (4) reached its decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Smith, 168 Idaho
463, ___, 483 P.3d 1006, 1019 (2021) (citations omitted).
C.

Smith Has Shown No Abuse Of The District Court’s Sentencing Discretion
The district court did not abuse its sentencing discretion when it imposed a unified sentence

of twenty years, with six years fixed. “When a trial court exercises its discretion in sentencing,
‘the most fundamental requirement is reasonableness.’” McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at
628 (quoting State v. Hooper, 119 Idaho 606, 608, 809 P.2d 467, 469 (1991)). “A sentence is
reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to
achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.” Id. (citing State
v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 836, 11 P.3d 27, 32 (2000)). The district court has the discretion to
weigh those objectives and give them differing weights when deciding upon the sentence. See id.
at 9, 368 P.3d at 629 (holding the district court imposed a reasonable sentence where it considered
and weighed the objectives of criminal punishment and both mitigating and aggravating factors);
State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 824-25, 965 P.2d 174, 184-85 (1998) (holding the district court
did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the objectives of punishment, deterrence and
protection of society outweighed the need for rehabilitation).
Furthermore, “[a] sentence fixed within the limits prescribed by the statute will ordinarily
not be considered an abuse of discretion by the trial court.” State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90, 645
P.2d 323, 324 (1982) (citation omitted). Where a sentence fits within statutory limits, the appellant
bears the burden of demonstrating that the sentence imposed is a clear abuse of discretion.
McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (citations omitted). To carry this burden the appellant
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must show the sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. Id.; State v. Toohill,
103 Idaho 565, 568, 50 P.2d 707, 711 (Ct. App. 1982). To establish that the sentence was
excessive, the appellant must demonstrate that reasonable minds could not conclude the sentence
was appropriate to accomplish the sentencing goals of protecting society, deterrence,
rehabilitation, and retribution. State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007)
(citations omitted). However, “[i]n deference to the trial judge, [the] Court will not substitute its
view of a reasonable sentence where reasonable minds might differ.” McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8,
368 P.3d at 628 (quoting Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148-49, 191 P.3d 217, 226-27 (2008)).
Smith concedes that his sentence “does not exceed the statutory maximum.” (Appellant’s
brief, p.4.) Trafficking in more than two but less than seven grams of heroin is punishable by a
mandatory minimum fixed term of imprisonment of three years and a maximum term of life
imprisonment. Idaho Code §§ 37-2732B(a)(6)(A), 37-2732B(a)(6)(D). In this case, the district
court imposed a unified sentence of twenty years, with six years fixed. (R., pp.120-23.) Because
the sentence imposed fits within the statutory limits, Smith “must show that the sentence, in light
of the governing criteria, is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts.” State v. Strand,
137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002). He cannot do so.
The sentence imposed was reasonable. In fashioning Smith’s sentence, the district court
reviewed the presentence investigation materials and considered the necessary sentencing factors.
(10/21/20 Tr., p.22, Ls.19-23; p.36, Ls.3-13; see R., pp.138-40.) The court found Smith’s criminal
record to be “quite extensive.” (10/21/20 Tr., p.33, L.5; see PSI pp.8-14.) Smith’s criminal history
began in 1985 with a felony conviction for attempting to elude. (PSI, p.9.) The court found that
Smith had consistently engaged in criminal conduct ever since, and was subsequently convicted
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of approximately twenty felonies. (10/21/20 Tr., p.33, Ls.6-11; see
- PSI, pp.8-14.) Smith had also
been charged with nearly thirty misdemeanors, resulting in numerous convictions. (PSI, pp.8-14.)
The district court also considered Smith’s underlying conduct. The court noted that Smith
was stopped with a loaded syringe in the car and exhibited signs of being under the influence.
(10/21/20 Tr., p.33, L.22 – p.34, L.5.) Additionally, based on Smith’s guilty pleas the court found
that he knew there were drugs in the vehicle and that he knew he was driving under the influence.
(Tr., p.35, L.24 – p.36, L.3.) Given the nature of the offense and Smith’s character, the court
concluded that he had not shown “any indication … that [he] could change [his] behavior” and
thus posed a “huge risk to the public.” (10/21/20 Tr., p.36, Ls.3-13.) Accordingly, the court stated
that the sentence imposed was intended to achieve the primary sentencing goal of protecting the
public. (Id.) Because the court imposed Smith’s sentence in order to achieve the primary
sentencing goal based on Smith’s underlying conduct and his extensive criminal history, the
sentence imposed was reasonable.
Smith contends his sentence is excessive in light of certain mitigating factors. (Appellant’s
brief, pp.3-4.)

Specifically, Smith refers to his expression of remorse and acceptance of

responsibility, his career aspirations, the fact that he’s a moderate risk of reoffending, an alleged
commitment to sobriety, and the fact that he claims to have support from friends. (Appellant’s
brief, p.5.) According to Smith, proper consideration of these mitigating factors warranted a more
lenient sentence. (Id.) He is incorrect.
The district court properly weighed any mitigating factors when it originally imposed
Smith’s sentence. In fashioning Smith’s sentence, the court considered his expression of remorse.
(10/21/20 Tr., p.30, L.18 – p.31, L.5.) The court sensibly gave it little weight, if any, because
Smith merely expressed remorse for getting caught rather than expressing sincere remorse for his

5

criminal conduct. (10/21/20 Tr., p.34, L.8 – p.35, L.7.) The court also considered Smith’s
acceptance of responsibility, and reasonably gave it little weight as Smith had repeatedly blamed
others for the crime. (10/21/20 Tr., p.33, Ls.12-24; p.35, L.8 – p.36, L.3.) The court also
considered mitigating information in the PSI such as Smith’s employment, support from friends,
and his alleged commitment to sobriety. (See 10/21/20 Tr., p.22, Ls.19-23; PSI, p.14.) Finally,
any mitigating weight warranted by the fact that Smith was assessed to be a moderate risk to
reoffend was substantially outweighed by the aggravating nature of his extensive criminal history
and history of substance abuse. (PSI, pp.6, 8-14.) Even considering this mitigating information,
the court determined that the sentence imposed was necessary to protect society due to the
aggravating information presented in this case. (10/21/20 Tr., p.36, Ls.3-13.)
In sum, Smith has failed to show that the court did not exercise reason simply because it
gave less weight to mitigating information than he desired. See State v. Cobler, 148 Idaho 769,
773, 229 P.3d 374, 378 (2010) (finding no abuse of discretion upon a weighing of mitigating and
aggravating factors in sentencing); State v. Stover, 140 Idaho 927, 932, 104 P.3d 969, 974 (2005)
(emphasizing the discretionary nature of weighing mitigating and aggravating factors). Because
the district court properly considered and applied the goals of sentencing and weighed the
aggravating circumstances against any mitigating information in fashioning Smith’s sentence, the
sentence imposed was reasonable. Smith has failed to show that the district court abused its
sentencing discretion.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the judgment of the district court.
DATED this 2nd day of July, 2021.

/s/ Justin R. Porter
JUSTIN R. PORTER
Deputy Attorney General
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